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Abstract
Trading under limited pre-trade transparency becomes increasingly popular on
financial markets. We provide first evidence on traders’ use of (completely) hid-
den orders which might be placed even inside of the (displayed) bid-ask spread.
Employing TotalView-ITCH data on order messages at NASDAQ, we propose a
simple method to conduct statistical inference on the location of hidden depth and
to test economic hypotheses. Analyzing a wide cross-section of stocks, we show
that market conditions reflected by the (visible) bid-ask spread, (visible) depth,
recent price movements and trading signals significantly affect the aggressiveness
of ’dark’ liquidity supply and thus the ’hidden spread’. Our evidence suggests that
traders balance hidden order placements to (i) compete for the provision of (hid-
den) liquidity and (ii) protect themselves against adverse selection, front-running
as well as ’hidden order detection strategies’ used by high-frequency traders. Ac-
cordingly, our results show that hidden liquidity locations are predictable given
the observable state of the market.
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1 Introduction
Since the introduction and the growing dominance of electronic trading during the
nineties, equity markets have trended toward higher transparency and more disclo-
sure of trading information. However, displayed limit orders reveal trading intentions
and may induce adverse selection effects, picking-off risks and “parasitic trading” (see,
e.g., Harris, 1997). Consequently, the question of how much transparency should be
optimally provided on a market is of ongoing importance. In particular, current devel-
opments in equity markets away from full transparency and back toward more opaque
market structures have made this question again very topical in recent market mi-
crostructure research.
In modern trading, traders seek to conceal trading strategies and to avoid adverse
price effects by hiding order sizes. Consequently, reserve (“iceberg”) orders which
require to display only a small fraction of the order size are increasingly popular and
can be used on virtually all major exchanges and trading platforms worldwide. An
even more extreme form of reducing pre-trade transparency is to trade in form of non-
display (“hidden”) orders which can be entirely hidden. Such orders do not even reveal
the posted limit price and thus act as completely hidden liquidity supply in the limit
order book (LOB). While there are a few empirical studies analyzing iceberg orders
(see, e.g., Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman, 2009; Frey and Sand˚as, 2009),
there is no empirical evidence on non-display orders. The important difference between
a reserve order and a hidden order is that in case of the latter not only the size but,
more importantly, also the location is unknown. This induces effects which are quite
different from those caused by reserve orders and which are not well understood yet. For
instance, the most interesting aspect behind hidden orders is that they can be placed
inside of the bid-ask spread without affecting visible best ask and bid quotes. In fact,
this mechanism creates enormous order activities in markets as market participants try
to “ping” for hidden liquidity inside of the spread by posting “fleeting orders” which
are canceled a few instants later if they do not get executed.
This paper aims at shedding light on the use of undisclosed orders in an electronic
market where not only order volumes but also their locations are hidden. To our best
knowledge, this study is the first one providing empirical evidence on liquidity sup-
ply which is completely ”dark” and thus features some elements of the supply side of a
dark pool. In contrast to prevailing empirical studies on the degree of order exposure in
reserve orders, our focus is on the analysis of hidden order locations and thus the aggres-
siveness of hidden liquidity supply. Using data from the NASDAQ TotalView message
stream allows us to retrieve information on hidden depth from one of the largest equity
markets in the world. We propose an ordered response approach with censoring mech-
anism to retrieve conditional probabilities of hidden order locations given the state of
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the market and to provide insights into the distribution of hidden orders across differ-
ent price levels. Performing statistical inference on the aggressiveness of hidden order
placements (e.g., within the spread) allows us to test economic theory on the relation
between the state of the market and traders’ incentive to hide orders. Our findings
based on a wide cross-section of NASDAQ stocks show that “dark” liquidity supply is
significantly driven by market conditions and thus predictable in terms of the state of
the (displayed) LOB. Empirical evidence supports the notion that hidden liquidity sub-
mitters balance their competition for liquidity supply versus the risk of non-execution.
Under certain market conditions, there is significant competition for hidden liquidity
supply inducing a narrowing of the “hidden” bid-ask spread. Conversely, in situations
where the risk of being picked off becomes high, we observe a significant reduction
in hidden order submitters’ aggressiveness. Moreover, we provide novel insights into
competition for hidden liquidity provision and hidden order placements in the presence
of aggressive ”hidden order detection strategies” used by algorithmic traders.
The current tendency of trading platforms toward more opaqueness is observable
on all major markets. We can differentiate between three major types of ”dark trad-
ing”. The first group of markets, including various non-U.S. markets, such as the
London Stock Exchange, Frankfurt Stock Exchange (XETRA), Australian Stock Ex-
change (ASX), Euronext, the Madrid Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange,
among others, offer the possibility of posting only iceberg orders (so-called reserve or-
ders) where the trader is obliged to show only a small proportion (“peak”) of the
posted order size. The second category of trading platforms allows to use both reserve
and hidden orders and thus offers the option to entirely hide an order. Prominent
examples are NASDAQ, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), BATS (Best Alter-
native Trading System) – currently the third largest equity market in the U.S. – and
the largest U.S. Electronic Communication Network (ECN) Direct Edge. According
to the report by the Securities and Exchange Commission (2010), these markets cover
approximately 75% of share volume in National Market System (NMS) stocks. The
third group of modern trading systems are so-called dark pools where liquidity supply
is hidden and no information on order matching and trading actions is provided to
other market participants.
Recent empirical evidence shows that “dark trading” is not negligible and is in-
creasingly popular. For instance, Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009)
report that 44% of order volume is hidden and 18% of incoming orders are reserve
orders on Euronext Paris. Frey and Sand˚as (2009) show that reserve orders represent
9% of non-marketable orders with sizes of 12−20 times the average in German XETRA
trading. The Securities and Exchange Commission (2010) reports that 32 dark pools
in the U.S. contribute approximately 8% of trading volume in NMS stocks. Figure 1
shows percentages of trading volume executed against hidden liquidity for 99 NASDAQ
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Figure 1: Percentage of trading volumes executed against hidden depth for 99 NASDAQ
stocks representing a wide cross-section of the market. The stocks are sorted according to their
average bid-ask spreads during the investigation period.
stocks used in our empirical analysis. Averaged across a wide range of the market, ap-
proximately 14% of the share volume originates from hidden depth. However, for some
stocks, especially those revealing high spreads, it can be even greater than 40%.
The major motivation for hiding orders is to camouflage trading intention. The
latter increases execution risk as the display of (large) orders may cause impatient
traders to retreat (Moinas, 2010) and may lead to higher liquidity competition (Buti and
Rindi, 2011). Moreover, posting limit orders induces front-running strategies (Harris,
1997), and the risk of adverse selection (“picking off risk”; see Harris, 1996). By
hiding an order, execution risks can be reduced, while, on the other hand, the risk of
non-execution rises as trading counterparties are not obviously attracted. Moreover,
typically, hidden orders lose time priority to displayed orders. Hence, for a hidden
order submitter it is crucial to balance the risk of non-execution vs. the risk of adverse
selection.
Our empirical methodology is designed to provide insights into the placement of
hidden orders and and to link them to the (observable) state of the market. Conse-
quently, we are able to test implications from economic theory and to predict hidden
order placements. The used data contains information on any order activity at NAS-
DAQ and allows to completely reproduce the (displayed) LOB at each instant. As the
data directly stems from the NASDAQ trading feed (and thus is publicly available even
in real time), it naturally does not reveal direct information on hidden order locations.
Nevertheless, as a crucial ingredient which (to our best knowledge) has not been ex-
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ploited by any empirical study yet, it contains information on executions against hidden
orders. Consequently, we are able to (ex post) identify whenever (at least partly) a hid-
den order has been executed. Likewise, market orders which are not executed against
hidden depth and limit orders placed into the prevailing spread provide us implicit
information on the non-existence of hidden orders on certain price levels.
To identify the locations of (executed) hidden orders, we employ two approaches.
Firstly, we measure hidden order aggressiveness in terms of the distance between the
order price and the best (visible) quote on the own side of the LOB. The larger this
distance, the deeper a hidden order is placed within the spread and the higher is its
aggressiveness. The second approach employs the distance to the best visible quote
on the opposite side of the market. The lower this distance, the lower the transaction
costs for a market order submitter on the opposite side. We show that both distance
measures are necessary to fully capture hidden order placements. To fully exploit also
(ex post) identifications on the non-existence of hidden orders on certain price grids,
we set up an ordered response model with censoring mechanism yielding conditional
probabilities of hidden order placements in terms of aggressiveness categories given the
state of the market.
Using this setup, we analyze whether hidden order placements can be explained by
the economic reasoning of balancing execution risk vs. exposure risk and thus can be
predicted using the observable state of the LOB. In particular, we address three major
research questions: (i) Does hidden liquidity supply compete with observable order
flow and react to trading directions? (ii) Is there competition between hidden liquidity
suppliers themselves? (iii) How does hidden supply react to ”hidden order detection
strategies”?
Analyzing hidden order placements for 99 stocks covering a wide cross-section of
the NASDAQ market in 2010, we can summarize the following results: First, hidden
order placements follow trade directions in order to increase execution probabilities
and to reduce adverse selection. In particular, market participants submit hidden
orders less aggressively when the price moves in their favorable direction. Second, the
“hidden” spread is positively correlated with the observed spread. This is particularly
true for stocks with comparably high (average) spreads. Third, there is significant
competition for the provision of liquidity. This is true for hidden liquidity as traders
use more aggressive hidden orders after observing competing hidden depth on the
own side. Moreover, it is also true for the competition between hidden and disclosed
liquidity. The latter is empirically supported by a strong (positive) correlation between
undisclosed orders and the visible depth on the same side of the market. Fourth, hidden
order submitters become more defensive when high-frequency traders actively “ping”
for undisclosed volume in the spread. Overall, our findings clearly show that hidden
orders are placed strategically in order to balance non-execution risks and adverse
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selection risks.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way: In Section 2, we re-
view theoretical and empirical literature and formulate economic hypotheses. Section 3
briefly introduces the market environment and presents details on data construction
and descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we introduce the econometric approach to
model the aggressiveness of dark liquidity supply. In Section 5, we report and discuss
the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Economic Reasoning of Optimal Order Display
2.1 Market Microstructure Theory
A major motivation for posting a limit order is to minimize transaction costs by ap-
propriately choosing the limit price and to signal trading intention to other market
participants in order to attract counterparties which might be not in the market yet
(according to Harris (1996), so-called “passive traders”). Compared to market orders,
limit orders impose lower execution costs as they are executed at better prices (avoiding
to cross the bid-ask spread), however bear the risk of non-execution if the market moves
in opposite direction. This results into the fundamental trade-off between transaction
costs (induced by a market order) and execution risks.
Hence, attracting a counterparty by maximizing the degree of order exposure is
important to increase the execution probability and to decrease the execution time of
the position. Such a strategy, however, induces also various adverse effects. Firstly,
as empirically shown by Hautsch and Huang (2011), signaling trading intention may
induce significant (adverse) price reactions. Secondly, according to Moinas (2010),
displaying large orders may cause “defensive” market order traders to retreat from the
market as soon as they interpret the signal as inside information. Thirdly, “parasitic”
traders (Harris, 1997) may exploit the information value of a big order by using front-
running strategies. Finally, posting a limit order induces the risk of being picked off
and thus adverse selection (Harris, 1996). The latter occurs if limit orders cannot be
canceled fast enough in a situation when prices move stronger in the favorable direction
than expected. Consequently, the order becomes mis-priced. These effects induce the
“exposure costs” (Buti and Rindi, 2011) of a displayed limit order.
These exposure costs can be alleviated by reducing the order exposure or – in
the extreme case – completely hiding the order. A hidden order does not cause any
price impact and prevents undercutting while still allowing to (aggressively) compete
for the provision of liquidity, particularly if the hidden order undercuts (or overbids,
respectively) the prevailing best limit price. However, a hidden order still runs adverse
selection risks and, moreover, bears higher execution risks. This results into a trade-off
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between exposure costs and execution risks.
Based on these economic reasoning, several theories on the usage of undisclosed
orders have been developed. Esser and Mo¨nch (2007) propose a static framework in
which the trader optimizes the peak size and limit price of reserve orders by contin-
uously monitoring and balancing exposure risk against execution risk. Moinas (2010)
presents a theoretical model where informed traders as well as large liquidity traders
use reserve orders to mitigate the information leakage. Cebiroglu and Horst (2011)
propose a model where traders decide on the peak size of the iceberg order by account-
ing for the exposure-induced market impact. Buti and Rindi (2011) present a dynamic
framework where the trader chooses her optimal strategy by simultaneously deciding
on trading direction, aggressiveness, size and peak proportion of the order. To our best
knowledge, it is the only theoretical model that explicitly incorporates the possibility
of hiding orders within the bid-ask spread into traders’ trading options. In particular,
Buti and Rindi (2011) consider the possibility of so-called hidden mid-point peg orders,
i.e., hidden orders which are pegged to the midpoint of the national best bid and offer
(NBBO).
2.2 Empirical Evidence on Undisclosed Orders
The empirical literature on reserve orders has been growing remarkably during the
last decade, partially due to its proliferation in limit order markets and the increasing
availability of data. Studying trading on Euronext Paris, Bessembinder, Panayides,
and Venkataraman (2009) document that reserve orders induce lower implementation
short fall costs but longer times to fill. De Winne and D’Hondt (2007) examine similar
data and find that the detection of hidden depth increases order aggressiveness on
the opposite side. Fleming and Mizrach (2009) examine data from BrockerTec, the
leading interdealer ECN for U.S. Treasuries and documenting that the use of reserve
orders varies considerably with the quantity of hidden depth increasing with price
volatility. All studies show that the decision on using reserve orders is strongly related
to prevailing market conditions, as characterized by the bid-ask spread, book depth
and prevailing volatility.
Studying data from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), Aitken, Berkman, and
Mak (2001) find that reserve orders do not have a different price impact than visible
limit orders. According to their results, the use of reserve orders increases with volatil-
ity and the average order value, while it decreases in tick size and trading activity.
Frey and Sand˚as (2009) analyze the Deutsche Bo¨rse’s trading platform XETRA and
show that the price impact of the reserve order depends on the executed fraction of
its size with profitability increasing in the hidden proportion. Based on data from the
Spanish Stock Exchange Pardo Tornero and Pascual (2007) find no significant price
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impact associated with the execution of hidden parts of reserve orders. These find-
ings support the hypothesis that liquidity suppliers use reserve orders to compete for
liquidity provision while preventing picking-off risks.
Tuttle (2006) shows that the overall market depth increased significantly after NAS-
DAQ introduced undisclosed orders. Moreover, she provides evidence for hidden sizes
being predictive for future market price movements while the visible size conveys only
little information. Likewise, analyzing data from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange,
Belter (2007) shows that non-displayed orders have more information content which,
however, cannot be exploited to predict future returns. Anand and Weaver (2004) ex-
amine the abolition in 1996 and re-introduction in 2002 of reserve orders on the Toronto
Stock Exchange and show that the spread and visible depth remain widely unchanged
after both events. However, total depth, including both visible and hidden volume,
significantly increases after the re-introduction. Both studies show that market quality
is improved after the introduction of reserve orders and that informed traders tend to
use them primarily to reduce the price impact.
2.3 Testable Hypotheses
Theoretical models on optimal order (non-)display, such as Buti and Rindi (2011), con-
sider the optimization problem of a limit order submitter who simultaneously decides
on limit price, order volume as well as degree of exposure. The market participant’s
objective is to maximize her expected profit conditional on the (observable) state of
the LOB by optimally balancing exposure and execution risks. This induces testable
hypotheses on the relation between the state of the market and the chosen degree of
exposure.
In contrast to prevailing empirical studies evaluating order exposure in reserve or-
ders, our focus is on the analysis of traders’ decisions where to post a hidden order.
In terms of its aggressiveness, a hidden order can be seen as an instrument catego-
rized between a (displayed) limit order at the best available quote and a market order.
Compared to a market order, it still allows to benefit from price improvements (as
the bid-ask spread is not crossed completely) but faces non-execution risks as well
as adverse selection risk. Hence, the economic reasoning behind the decision where
to optimally place a hidden order is triggered by a balancing of (non-)execution risk,
implied transaction costs and adverse selection risk. As discussed below in light of
market microstructure theory, these considerations lead to testable hypotheses on the
relationship between the state of the market and the aggressiveness of hidden order
placements.
Asymmetric information based market microstructure theory (see, e.g., Easley,
Kiefer, and O’Hara, 1997) suggests that wide bid-ask spreads reflect uncertainty on
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the fundamental value of the asset and on the presence of informed traders in the
market. Consequently, the transaction costs implied by potential adverse selection in-
crease, particularly if a hidden order is placed inside of the spread. To keep these
risks and costs on a moderate level, liquidity suppliers should post their hidden orders
not too deeply in the spread. Indeed, in such a situation they can benefit from a wide
spread which naturally provides sufficient room to overbid or undercut best (displayed)
quotes and thus to aggressively compete for liquidity supply while still being placed
in sufficient distance from the opposite side of the market. Conversely, if spreads are
narrow, the room for price improvements beyond best quotes is limited as the spread
can only be a multiple of the minimum tick size. For instance, in the extreme case of a
two-tick spread, traders who want to increase the execution probability by overbidding
best quotes, are forced to place their order at the mid-quote. This high discreteness
of possible price steps within the bid-ask spread forces liquidity suppliers who want to
undercut best quotes have to become more aggressive than in a (hypothetical) situation
of a continuous price grid. As a consequence of such “overbidding”, hidden liquidity
suppliers are more aggressive in small-spread states than in large-spread states. Conse-
quently, we expect a positive correlation between the observable spread and the “hidden
spread”, defined as the difference between the best hidden ask and bid quotes:
Hypothesis 1 The aggressiveness of hidden depth inside of the spread decreases with
the size of the spread, i.e., observable and hidden spreads are positively correlated.
Traders can use undisclosed orders to compete for the provision of liquidity while
preventing others from undercutting their orders. Buti and Rindi (2011) demonstrate
that undisclosed orders are part of equilibrium strategies of liquidity suppliers who
maximize expected profits. In particular, when the depth on the own side of the market
is high (relative to the other side), traders prefer to place more aggressive hidden orders
inside of the spread to increase their execution probability. Moreover, relatively higher
depth on the own side reflects price expectations in the favorable direction which in
turn reduces the risk of (adversely) being picked up. Conversely, in case of a (relatively)
high depth on the opposite side of the market, picking-up risks are higher as a high
depth on the opposite side may reflect further price pressure. Hence, in such a situation,
the downside of order aggressiveness in order to compete for liquidity supply, is much
stronger than in the case of a high own-side depth. Confirming this reasoning, the
theoretical setting by Buti and Rindi (2011) predicts a higher tendency of traders to
post hidden orders within the bid-ask spread if the own-side depth is high and the
opposite-side depth is low. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.A The probability of hidden depth inside of the spread increases when
the own-side depth increases relatively to the opposite-side depth.
Hypothesis 2.B The probability of hidden depth inside of the spread decreases when
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the opposite-side depth increases relatively to the own-side depth.
Traders’ order submission strategies depend not only on the current state of the
LOB but also on recent price movements and trading signals. The dynamic equilibrium
model on visible order flow proposed by Parlour (1998) shows a “crowding out” effect
among market orders: the probability of incoming sell (buy) market orders is lower
after observing a buy (sell) market order which is in line with the well-known strong
persistence in trade directions. This effect implies that visible bid (ask) limit orders
have a higher execution probability after a sell (buy) market order. This hypothesis
is supported by Hall and Hautsch (2005) showing that price movements are positively
(negatively) correlated with the aggressiveness of visible buy (sell) limit orders. We
expect that liquidity suppliers take advantage of these trading signals by posting hidden
orders deeper inside of the spread in order to increase execution probabilities. However,
as argued above, in situations where liquidity suppliers aim at benefiting from price
pressure built up on the opposite side of the market, their exposure to adverse selection
risk increases and may dominate execution risk.
A similar reasoning applies in situations when market participants expect momen-
tum in prevailing price movements. Then, it might be advantageous to reduce the risk
of non-execution by placing aggressive hidden orders after observing price movements
in favorable direction. However, we expect these effects being weaker than in case
of trading signals as the predictability of price changes (even over short horizons) is
typically much lower than the persistence in trading directions:
Hypothesis 3.A The probability of hidden bid depth inside of the spread decreases
(increases) when the prevailing trade is seller (buyer)-initiated. The converse
effect applies for hidden ask depth.
Hypothesis 3.B The aggressiveness of hidden bid depth increases (decreases) after
observing upward (downward) movements in prices.
Traders’ decision on using undisclosed orders might also depend on the asset’s
volatility. Foucault (1999) shows that volatility is an important parameter in order
submission strategies. Indeed, higher volatility implies higher uncertainty on the value
of the asset and thus increases picking-off risk. Buti and Rindi (2011) show that this
mechanism is true not only for visible orders but also for hidden orders:
Hypothesis 4 The aggressiveness of hidden depth is negatively correlated with pre-
vailing asset price volatility.
Hidden depth is a priori unobservable but is ex post identifiable as soon as it
gets executed. This is, for instance, most clearly seen if a limit order posted inside
of the spread gets immediate execution. Such information provides hidden liquidity
providers hints on the possible prevailing competition for hidden liquidity supply. As
a result of higher (hidden) liquidity competition, they post more aggressive orders to
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increase their execution probability. This is theoretically shown by Buti and Rindi
(2011) who predict that detections of hidden depth encourage even more undisclosed
order submissions as long as picking-off risks do not become too high. The reasoning
is that market participants interpret the detection of hidden volume as a signal of high
liquidity demand and compete for supplying it. Accordingly, we postulate the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 The aggressiveness of hidden bid (ask) depth increases after some
hidden bid (ask) depth has been executed.
In modern trading, high-frequency trading (HFT) plays an increasingly important
role (see e.g., Angel, Harris, and Spatt, 2010; Securities and Exchange Commission,
2010) and might also influence the supply for hidden liquidity. In fact, HFT algorithms
use front-running strategies (so-called “scalping”) by posting a limit order in front of
some other limit order which is expected to reveal information. Likewise, exploiting
their low latency, mis-priced limit orders are picked up nearly instantaneously before
they get canceled. Moreover, HFT trading algorithms also embed strategies for detect-
ing hidden depth, such as “pinging”, where visible (e.g., so-called Immediate-or-Cancel;
IOC) limit orders are posted in the spread in order to test whether they might get exe-
cuted. Our empirical results show that such effects create enormous order activities at
NASDAQ. Pinging strategies, combined with scalping, induce severe picking-off risks
for undisclosed orders and may make them quite inefficient. Indeed, Buti and Rindi
(2011) theoretically show that when hidden depth can be perfectly detected there is no
reason for traders using undisclosed orders to reduce exposure risks. Accordingly, we
expect that hidden liquidity suppliers become less aggressive if high-frequency traders
become very active in the market:
Hypothesis 6 The aggressiveness of hidden depth decreases as HFT activities on the
opposite side of the market increase.
In the theoretical framework by Moinas (2010), informed traders use undisclosed
orders to mitigate information leakage. Typically, information asymmetry is highest
during the opening period as overnight information has to be processed. Accordingly,
we expect a higher hidden order aggressiveness in this period compared to the rest of
the trading day. Moreover, Esser and Mo¨nch (2007) show that traders tend to display
more of order sizes when they approach trading closure. This is driven by the typical
requirement to close a position before the end of the trading session. Accordingly,
trading intentions are revealed such that order execution probabilities are increased
due to a higher time priority of visible orders. Buti and Rindi (2011) also argue that
reserve orders are preferable to hidden orders in their framework when the time horizon
becomes shorter. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7.A The aggressiveness of hidden depth is higher after market opening.
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Hypothesis 7.B The aggressiveness of hidden depth is lower during market closure.
3 Quantifying Hidden Order Locations
3.1 Institutional Background
As one of the largest electronic limit order markets in the world, the NASDAQ Single-
Book platform provides an unified procedure for passing limit orders from ECNs (Brut
and INET) and the traditional dealer-quote system. In particular, it treats a market
maker’s quote as a pair of limit orders on both sides of the market and aggregates them
into a centralized order book. During continuous trading between 9:30 and 16:00 E.T.,
the system matches incoming orders against the best (in term of price) prevailing (pos-
sibly undisclosed) orders in the LOB. If there is insufficient volume to fully execute the
incoming order, the remaining part will be consolidated into the book. Besides limit
orders and market orders, NASDAQ offers market participants to use both reserve or-
ders and hidden orders.1 As a reward for traders disclosing their orders, the hidden
part of undisclosed orders loses time priority compared to visible limit orders or peaks
of reserve orders on the same price level. Market makers at NASDAQ may also provide
hidden depth. The NASDAQ Stock Market trading rule (NASDAQ, 2008) requires the
market maker to display at least one round lot size. In this case, the market maker’s
quotation corresponds to a pair of reserve orders.
3.2 Data
We conduct our study based on 99 stocks traded on NASDAQ during October 2010
corresponding to 21 trading days. To represent a wide cross-section across the market,
we select stocks according to market capitalization. We first rank the 500 biggest
NASDAQ stocks according to their market capitalizations as recorded by the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database on 30th September 2010. Furthermore,
we restrict the sample by selecting a stock out of every percentile resulting in 99 stocks
which are divided into three equal-size groups according to their average spreads and
trade frequencies.
We retrieve historical NASDAQ market conditions from TotalView-ITCH data.
NASDAQ TotalViewSM data, surpassing NASDAQ Level 2, is the current standard
1NASDAQ also provides so-called “discretionary orders” with a displayed price and size as well as a
non-displayed discretionary price range. When the discretionary price range is hit by a matching order,
the discretionary order converts into an IOC market order. This order type also allows to hide trading
intention. However, we do not consider discretionary orders as undisclosed orders because (i) they take
liquidity rather than providing it, and (ii) it is very difficult to identify them using TotalView-ITCH
data as HFT algorithms generate an enormous number of IOC orders.
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NASDAQ data feed for displaying the real-time full book depth for market participants.
Historical data files record rich information on order activities, including limit order
submissions, cancellations, executions of visible and hidden orders as well as a unique
identification number for every (visible) limit order and peak of reserve orders.
We reconstruct the historical LOB using the algorithm proposed by Huang and
Polak (2011). Their algorithm continuously updates the LOB according to all reported
messages and represents the exact state of the LOB as shown to TotalView subscribers
in real time. Furthermore, we identify the attribute of a limit order (cancelled or filled)
and compute its lifetime by tracking it through its order ID.2 Finally, we aggregate
sequences of executions of buy (sell) limit or hidden orders occurring in less than 0.1
seconds into one sell (buy) market order. If a limit order is recorded immediately after
such a sequence, it is also aggregated with the entire sequence being considered as a
marketable limit order. Finally, to avoid erratic effects during the market opening and
closure, our sample period covers only the periods between 9:45 and 15:45.
Table 1 summarizes major characteristics of the selected stocks. They cover a wide
universe of stocks with market capitalization ranging from 900 million to 260 billion
US dollar. We find a clear evidence for a high popularity of undisclosed orders in
NASDAQ trading. On average, approximately 15% of the trading volume and 20%
of all trades are executed against hidden depth. The average size of executed hidden
depth is slightly smaller than that of visible depth. This is partially due to active HFTs
who use high-speed hidden depth detecting algorithms to compete for trading against
hidden volume. Moreover, note that only a small proportion of existing hidden depth
gets executed (see e.g., Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman, 2009; Frey and
Sand˚as, 2009). Hence, the share of (undetected) hidden depth is much greater than the
magnitudes reported in the table. Furthermore, we show that the proportion of trading
volume executed against hidden depth increases as the (average) spread becomes wider.
Hence, traders of high-spread stocks are more likely to benefit from price improvements
due to the existence of hidden depth.
Table 2 reports summary statistics on limit order executions and cancellations.
On average, approximately 95% of all limit orders are cancelled without getting (par-
tially) executed. This strikingly high number is robust across the sample with the
cross-sectional standard deviation being very low. In fact, the stock with the smallest
proportion of cancellations still reveals a percentage of 91%. Conversely, we observe
the most extreme situation of a stock revealing 99% of all limit orders to be cancelled.
Moreover, the median lifetime of cancelled orders is less than 10 seconds. For limit
orders placed inside of the spread, the average time until cancellation is just around
3 seconds. This effect is obviously driven by a strong influence of HFT-induced ping-
2LOB reconstruction and limit order tracking is performed by the software ”LOBSTER” which can
be accessed at http://lobster.wiwi.hu-berlin.de.
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Table 1
Cross-Sectional Summary Statistics on the Characteristics of the Selected Stocks.
The sample consists of 99 NASDAQ stocks during October 2010 corresponding to 21 trading
days. We divide them into three equal-size groups according to the average spread (AvgSpr)
and the number of trades (AvgTrd). For each group, we report summary statistics of the
following variables: MktCap is the market capitalization accroding to CRSP at 30 September,
2010. AvgSpr (in ¢) is the average spread in dollar cent. AvgTrd is the average number of daily
trades. AvgHit is the average number of daily trades (partly or totally) traded against hidden
depth. AvgHit (in %) is the average percentage of daily trades (partly or totally) traded against
hidden volume. AvgVol is the average daily trading volume (in thousand shares). AvgHVol is
the average daily trading volume traded against hidden depth. AvgHVol (in %) is the average
daily percentage of executed hidden volume relative to overall trading volume.
MktCap AvgSpr AvgTrd AvgHit AvgHit AvgVol AvgHVol AvgHVol
(in bil. $) (in ¢) (in %) (×103Shr) (×103Shr) (in %)
Entire Mean 7.83 5.38 1861 429 20.1 3.93 0.59 14.6
Sample Median 2.16 3.77 1083 178 18.7 2.05 0.21 13.5
Std. 28.19 6.01 2616 959 7.9 5.87 1.59 8.1
Min. 0.89 1.07 98 12 9.1 0.12 0.01 3.9
Max. 259.90 34.91 20583 8446 46.0 41.37 14.37 42.8
AvgSpr Small 9.00 1.36 2199 316 14.0 5.84 0.37 6.9
Groups Medium 3.81 3.68 1776 414 20.0 3.08 0.54 15.0
(means) Large 10.69 11.10 1608 558 26.2 2.88 0.86 21.8
AvgTrd Low 1.50 8.85 461 91 20.4 0.70 0.10 16.3
Group Medium 2.91 4.05 1121 202 18.2 2.10 0.24 12.7
(means) High 19.09 3.23 4002 994 21.6 9.00 1.42 14.7
ing strategies aiming at detecting hidden orders inside of the spread. Interestingly,
large visible limit orders have much longer execution times than small orders. This
is indicated by the volume-weighted execution time of 142 seconds being substantially
higher than the median lifetime of executed limit orders (12.9 seconds). This evidence
is in line with extant empirical studies of the market impact of limit orders (see, e.g.,
Eisler, Bouchaud, and Kockelkoren, 2011; Hautsch and Huang, 2011) showing support-
ive evidence of large traders’ economic motivation for using undisclosed orders. Finally,
cancellation rates of aggressive limit orders turn out to be lower as they have higher
execution probabilities.
3.3 Identifying Undisclosed Orders
It is in the nature of things, that information on hidden order placements is not provided
by an exchange. Therefore, from classical transaction data sets, as, e.g., the Trade
and Quote (TAQ) database released by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), it
is impossible to infer on hidden orders. This difficulty is the major reason for the
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Table 2
Cross-Sectional Summary Statistics on Limit Order Executions and Cancellations
The sample consists of 99 NASDAQ stocks during October 2010 corresponding to 21 trading
days. We divide them into three equal-size groups according to the average spread (AvgSpr) and
the number of trades (AvgTrd). For each group, we report cross-sectional summary statistics
for the following variables: NumLO is the average daily number of limit orders (including peaks
of reserve orders). NumCanc is the average daily number of limit order cancellations before
getting (partially) executed. MedCTim is the median of the lifetime of canceled visible limit
orders. MedETim is the median of the lifetime of executed limit orders. VWETim is the
volume-weighted execution time of limit orders. NumALO is the average daily number of limit
orders placed inside of the spread (aggressive limit orders). NumACan (in %) is the average
daily percentage of canceled aggressive limit orders placed inside of the spread. AvgATim is
the average lifetime of canceled aggressive limit orders.
NumLO NumCanc MedCTim MedETim VWETim NumALO NumACan AvgATim
(×103) (in %) (sec.) (sec.) (sec.) (×103) (in %) (sec.)
Entire Mean 57.92 94.7 9.7 12.9 142.0 3.84 76.3 3.11
Sample Median 29.41 94.8 9.2 10.7 103.7 2.52 79.7 2.12
Std. 84.50 1.9 6.3 9.5 152.2 5.81 14.9 4.79
Min. 5.01 90.9 0.0 0.8 39.9 0.07 29.4 0.02
Max. 650.66 99.2 33.2 60.3 981.2 49.9 98.7 41.0
AvgSpr Small 79.93 93.7 10.0 15.8 154.8 1.85 61.1 1.27
Groups Medium 47.14 94.5 11.2 10.6 114.2 4.06 79.6 3.23
(means) Large 46.69 95.9 7.8 12.4 156.9 5.62 88.1 4.84
AvgTrd Low 14.67 96.0 12.5 19.9 216.2 2.42 85.1 2.1
Group Medium 33.50 94.3 9.3 12.2 109.5 2.50 75.5 2.04
(means) High 125.6 93.9 7.2 6.7 100.1 6.61 68.2 5.12
lacking empirical evidence on hidden order placements. Message data, as provided by
TotalView, however, contain information on any activities affecting the visible part of
the LOB. In particular, it specifically reports executions against hidden orders which
allow us to identify the exact position of hidden depth in the LOB. As illustrated
below, these details can be utilized to conduct statistical inference on undisclosed order
submissions.
In general, we distinguish between trading scenarios where we can distinctly (ex
post) identify the location of hidden volume and situations where we can isolate at
least partial information on the existence of undisclosed volume. Figure 2 illustrates
an example of the first scenario where the best (visible) quotes in the LOB are 24.86
(bid) and 24.91 (ask) before a buy limit order with limit price 24.91 is posted. As there
is a hidden ask order at price 24.90 inside of the spread, the incoming order is firstly
partially filled by this order resulting in a type “P” trade message (denoting executions
against hidden depth in the NASDAQ ITCH 4.0 format). Next, the remaining part of
the buy order is executed against the visible depth at the best ask resulting in an “E”
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Figure 2: Left: Stylized trading scenario in an LOB where a buy market order is executed
against hidden volume on the ask side and is uniquely identified. Bid orders are marked by
green, whereas ask orders are marked by red. All orders above the horizontal axis are visible,
whereas orders below the axis are hidden. The numbered arrows indicate the matching process.
Right: Sequence of generated messages (in NASDAQ ITCH 4.0 format) resulting from this
transaction.
message. Finally, hidden depth at the best (visible) ask gets executed resulting in a
further “P” message. The remaining (non-executed) part of the incoming order enters
the book as a new buy limit order submission (type “A” message) at 24.91.3
This example shows that due to the existence of hidden depth, the market order
submitter faces a better execution price than expected from the visible LOB. If the
trader is able to predict the existence of hidden depth within the spread, she can
incorporate these transaction cost savings in her trading strategy. Moreover, it is
illustrated that the visible depth has execution priority over the hidden depth at the
same price, no matter when the order has been placed. Hence, if further depth on the
best ask level cumulates, the time-to-fill of any hidden order becomes longer. Finally,
since in this scenario, the execution of the hidden part is uniquely identified, we can
exactly locate the undisclosed order.
Figure 3 shows a scenario which allows extracting at least incomplete information
on hidden order placements. Suppose a buy limit order is submitted inside of the
spread with price 24.88. The fact that the limit order does not get executed (otherwise
we would have been observed a ”P” message), reflects that there cannot be any hidden
ask volume posted on a price level lower than 24.89. Hence, this observation reveals
information about the non-existence of hidden depth. We refer to such an observation
3As in general, visible and hidden volumes are indicated by more than one order at the same price,
we typically observe a sequence of simultaneous “P” and “E” messages.
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Figure 3: Left: Stylized trading scenario in an LOB where a limit order placed into the spread
reveals (partial) information about the hidden depth. Bid orders are marked by green, whereas
ask orders are marked by red. All orders above the horizontal axis are visible, whereas orders
below the axis are hidden. Right: Sequence of generated messages (in NASDAQ ITCH 4.0
format) resulting from this submission.
Figure 4: Left: Stylized trading scenario in an LOB where a buy market order is executed
against visible volume only and thus reveals (partial) information about the hidden depth.
Bid orders are marked by green, whereas ask orders are marked by red. All orders above
the horizontal axis are visible, whereas orders below the axis are hidden. Right: Sequence of
generated messages (in NASDAQ ITCH 4.0 format) resulting from this submission.
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as censored as it only provides a lower (upper) bound for the location of hidden ask
(bid) volume.
Finally, as illustrated by Figure 4, there might be a scenario where a marketable
order is executed against two (or several) levels of visible depth. The fact that not
even a part of the order is executed against hidden volume indicates the non-existence
of hidden ask depth on any level up to (including) price level 24.90. Hence, also this
observation is censored in the sense that it only yields a location (upper or lower)
bound.
Summarizing, we infer price information on undisclosed orders based on the follow-
ing three scenarios:
i. Submission of a marketable order when the spread is larger than one tick. If the
order gets executed at a price better than the corresponding best (visible) quote,
we can exactly identify the hidden order location and thus obtain an “uncensored”
observation. Otherwise, we have a “censored” observation.
ii. Submission of a limit order inside of the spread. If it is not executed, we certainly
know that there is no undisclosed order with better limit price. This results into
a “censored” observation.
iii. Submission of a marketable order with size greater than the depth at the corre-
sponding best (visible) quote. As this order may be split across several levels,
we can infer on hidden depth at-the-market or behind-the-market. The observa-
tion can be uncensored or censored depending on whether it is partially filled by
hidden depth or not.
3.4 Measuring the Aggressiveness of Undisclosed Orders
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) classify the aggressiveness of a limit order by measuring
its (price) distance to the prevailing best quotes. This scheme has been widely employed
in the empirical literature on limit orders (e.g., Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull, and White,
2000) and reserve orders (e.g., Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman, 2009).
Following these approaches, we measure distances of hidden order placements relative
to best quotes on the own and opposite side of the market.
Let pa and pb denote the best ask and bid quote and po represents the limit price of
the undisclosed order. A natural way is to measure the distance between the undisclosed
order and the best quote on the order’s own side,
s =
⎧⎨⎩po − pb for undisclosed buy orders,pa − po for undisclosed sell orders.
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Figure 5: Graphical illustration of the hidden order aggressiveness measure s and correspond-
ing classifications for the case of large-spread stocks (4 categories).
Hence, the larger s, the deeper the order is placed within the spread. Conversely, if
s ≤ 0, the undisclosed order is placed in the book (i.e., outside of the spread) and can
be either a reserve order or a hidden order. Accordingly, s measures aggressiveness
from the liquidity supplier’s perspective (therefore the label ”s”). Due to the fact that
most observations only reveal incomplete, i.e., “censored”, information, it is most nat-
ural to measure hidden order aggressiveness in terms of categories. As discussed in the
following sections, this allows for straightforward and computationally tractable econo-
metric modelling avoiding severe assumptions on the functional form. Depending on
the underlying (average) size of the spread, we choose different categorization schemes.
In particular, we divide the set of hidden order locations into 2, 3 and 4 categories for
small-spread, medium-spread and large-spread stocks, respectively. Table 3 gives the
chosen categories depending on s. The choice of the groups is motivated, on the one
hand, by the need to have a sufficient number of observations in each category and,
on the other hand, to use a preferably fine categorization within the spread. Figure 5
illustrates the resulting scheme for the case of large-spread stocks.
As bid-ask spreads are not constant over time, the distance measure s is not suffi-
cient to fully capture hidden order locations. It is rather necessary to measure orders’
aggressiveness also in terms of the distance to the opposite side of the market. Accord-
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Figure 6: Graphical illustration of the hidden order aggressiveness measure d and correspond-
ing classifications for the case of large-spread stocks (4 categories).
ingly, we define
d =
⎧⎨⎩pa − po for undisclosed buy orders,po − pb for undisclosed sell orders.
Hence, d represents undisclosed orders’ aggressiveness from the liquidity demander’s
perspective (therefore the label ”d”), see Figure 6. The smaller d, the lower the actual
transaction costs for a market order submitter who gets executed against this undis-
closed order. Note that d cannot become negative as any placement behind the opposite
side of the market would immediately result into an execution. As shown by Table 3,
we categorize d in a similar way to s. However, as d highlights the implied transaction
costs induced by execution against undisclosed orders, we choose a categorization which
is particularly fine close to the opposite side.
Note that the categorizations underlying the two measures can be partially over-
lapping. For instance, category 2 in Figure 5 overlaps with the categories 1 and 2 in
Figure 6, while category 3 in Figure 6 overlaps with categories 3 and 4 in Figure 5.
As shown in the empirical part of this paper, this overlapping structure is particularly
advantageous as it enables us to capture manifold (non-linear) changes of the hidden
depth distribution by means of relatively simple models.
Table 3 summarizes information on undisclosed orders. Firstly, the number of order
submissions revealing (at least partial) information on hidden depth is huge, especially
20
Table 3
Cross-sectional summary statistics on observations on undisclosed orders
The sample consists of 99 NASDAQ stocks during October 2010 corresponding to 21 trading
days. We divide them into three equal-size groups according to the average spread. The
aggressiveness of undisclosed orders is measured by s and d as described in Section 3.4. We
employ two, three and four categories for small-spread, medium-spread and large-spread stocks,
respectively. Censored observations are defined as in Section 3.3. For each group we show cross-
sectional statistics on total numbers (over all trading days).
Cate- Distance # Observation (×103) Censored Obs. (%) % Buy Orders (%)
gory (ticks) max. mean min. max. mean min. max. mean min.
Aggressiveness measured by the distance to the own side quote (s)
Spread group: small
“1” st > 0 147.65 29.32 1.71 96.5 83.3 26.2 52.7 49.8 45.5
“2” st ≤ 0 15.33 3.42 0.46 50.6 19.9 5.5 62.7 50.2 43.3
Spread group: medium
“1” st > 1 357.27 50.02 7.20 98.8 96.0 92.6 57.0 50.0 44.1
“2” st = 1 91.33 21.22 3.91 97.0 87.1 65.1 56.9 49.9 44.2
“3” st ≤ 0 63.17 7.895 1.12 83.3 65.0 41.2 58.4 48.5 43.6
Spread group: large
“1” st > 3 623.82 76.58 12.13 99.8 97.8 90.6 56.1 50.5 44.7
“2” st = 2, 3 193.84 17.04 0.40 98.6 86.4 38.2 56.8 51.2 47.7
“3” st = 1 107.46 9.48 0.33 90.2 64.7 23.0 56.0 49.0 43.6
“4” st ≤ 0 121.38 10.03 0.77 94.9 81.3 60.0 57.3 49.3 42.1
Aggressiveness measured by the distance to the opposite side quote (d)
Spread group: small
“1” dt = 1 156.96 31.12 2.07 94.1 75.2 22.4 54.4 49.8 45.1
“2” dt > 1 15.19 1.62 0.10 98.0 87.5 69.6 71.5 51.3 37.2
Spread group: medium
“1” dt = 1 327.35 57.75 9.89 97.5 93.2 86.3 55.6 50.0 45.0
“2” dt = 2 80.48 11.27 1.97 95.8 88.1 77.9 54.9 48.9 40.9
“3” dt > 2 99.99 10.11 0.94 93.7 81.3 52.5 61.0 50.4 39.2
Spread group: large
“1” dt = 1 561.97 61.63 12.96 99.8 97.2 92.1 55.4 50.4 42.5
“2” dt = 2 174.53 17.44 2.89 99.7 93.9 82.7 55.8 50.0 39.6
“3” dt = 3, 4 162.94 16.73 1.51 99.3 89.6 68.4 56.3 49.9 41.1
“4” dt > 4 147.06 17.34 0.64 98.0 82.0 46.4 77.4 52.0 41.7
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Table 4
Definitions of LOB control variables hidden orders on the buy side
“Aggressive limit orders” are defined as limit orders undercutting the prevailing best quote.
“Fleeting orders” are defined as limit orders that are canceled within one second after the
submission.
SPR ≡ log(best ask/best bid)
DPS ≡ log(depth at best bid (same side of the market))
DPO ≡ log(depth at best ask (opposite side of the market))
TY P ≡ 1 if the prevailing trade is seller-initiated; −1 otherwise
RET ≡ log return over the prevailing 5 minutes
V OL ≡ market price range (maximum - minimum) over the prevailing 5 minutes
HV S ≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden bid depth during the prevailing 1 minute)
HV S5≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden bid depth during the prevailing 5 minutes)
HRS ≡ HV S −HV S5
HVO ≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden ask depth during the prevailing 1 minute)
HVO5≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden ask depth during the prevailing 5 minutes)
HRO ≡ HV O −HVO5
ALS ≡ log(1+ number of aggressive buy limit orders that are not canceled during the
prevailing 3 minutes)
ALO ≡ log(1+ number of aggressive sell limit orders that are not canceled during the
prevailing 3 minutes)
HFS ≡ log(1+ number of fleeting buy orders during the prevailing 3 minutes)
HFO ≡ log(1+ number of fleeting sell orders during the prevailing 3 minutes)
OPN ≡ 1 trading before 10 : 30; 0, otherwise.
CLS ≡ 1 trading after 15 : 00; 0, otherwise.
for large-spread stocks. Secondly, more than 90% of all observations are censored in
the sense of reflecting only an upper bound of aggressiveness of hidden depth. Thirdly,
the number of observations on the buy and sell side are very similar.
Finally, note that we label the underlying categories in a consistent way with the
least aggressive categories being associated with the highest label and the most aggres-
sive category being associated with the lowest label. Hence, hidden order aggressiveness
declines with category labels.
3.5 Capturing Market Conditions
To test our postulated hypotheses and to relate the usage of undisclosed orders to
prevailing market conditions, we construct different variables representing various states
of the market. Table 4 gives the exact definitions of constructed variables used for
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hidden order submissions on the buy side. For statistical inference on the sell side, we
modify some of the variables as follows:
DPS ≡ log(depth at best ask)
DPO ≡ log(depth at best bid)
TY P ≡ 1 if the prevailing trade is buyer-initiated; −1 otherwise
RET ≡ negative log return over the prevailing 5 minutes
HV S ≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden ask depth during the prevailing 1
minute)
HV S5≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden ask depth during the prevailing 5
minutes)
HVO ≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden bid depth during the prevailing 1
minute)
HVO5≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden bid depth during the prevailing 5
minutes)
ALS ≡ log(1+ number of aggressive sell limit orders that are not canceled during
the prevailing 3 minutes)
ALO ≡ log(1+ number of aggressive buy limit orders that are not canceled during
the prevailing 3 minutes)
HFS ≡ log(1+ number of fleeting sell orders during the prevailing 3 minutes)
HFO ≡ log(1+ number of fleeting buy orders during the prevailing 3 minutes)
The prevailing LOB state is represented by the visible bid-ask spread (SPR), re-
flecting the (displayed) transaction costs of immediate trading, the visible depth on
the best level on the same side (DPS) and the visible depth on the best level on the
opposite side (DPO). To capture the impact of prevailing trade signals, we include
a dummy variable (TY P ) representing the most recent trading direction and the pre-
vailing five-minute mid-quote return (RET ) capturing short-term price movements.
Moreover, local price volatility (V OL) is included in terms of the (max/min) range of
trade prices during the last 5 minutes.
Information on prevailing hidden depth is incorporated by the short-run executed
hidden depth on the own side and the opposite side (HV S, HVO), representing how
successfully traders detected pending hidden depth. To capture temporal effects, we
also compute the executed hidden depth during the last minute relative to that executed
during the last five minutes (HRS, HRO). Moreover, HFT activities are captured by
two variables, HFS and HFO, which are the number of fleeting orders on the own side
and the opposite side, respectively. Defined as in Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), a “fleeting
order” is a limit order that is canceled within one second after the submission and thus
is posted to “test” for the existence of hidden volume within the spread. Using the
intensity of fleeting orders as a proxy for HFT activities is inspired by Hendershortt,
Jones, and Menkveld (2010). To differentiate between fleeting orders and “normal”
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limit orders, we also include the number of aggressive limit orders that have not been
canceled (ALS, ALO) and thus represent the frequency of quote updating by low
frequency traders. Finally, OPN and CLS are dummy variables representing the
opening and closure period. To be able to aggregate estimates across the market, all
variables (expect for dummies, i.e., TY P , OPN and CLS) are normalized to have zero
mean and unit standard deviation.
4 Econometric Modelling
The chosen categorizations straightforwardly motivate modeling hidden order locations
based on an ordered response model. This has several advantages: Firstly, censored
observations are straightforwardly taken into account. Secondly, relating market vari-
ables (as constructed in the previous section) to order categories rather than to plain
distances s and d, requires imposing less assumptions on functional form (e.g., linearity)
and allows reducing the impact of extreme observations (e.g., executions against hidden
depth deeply in the book). Thirdly, given the high number of observations (combined
with a significant cross-sectional dimension), a reduction of the computational burden
is crucial to make the approach tractable. In fact, exploiting the Gaussianity and global
concavity of objective functions in an ordered probit model allows to significantly re-
duce computation time in contrast to, for instance, a (censored) count data model (e.g.,
negative binomial model) for the variables s or d.
Therefore, we propose modelling hidden order placements using a censored ordered
probit model. In order to test our hypotheses, it is sufficient to utilize only order mes-
sages which provide information (censored or non-censored) on the location of undis-
closed volume. Consequently, the model is not estimated based on the continuous time
series of all order book messages but only based on those observations revealing some
information on hidden order locations. Moreover, we do not require a dynamic (e.g.,
autoregressive) approach as all information on the current and prevailing state of the
market is captured by corresponding regressors.
4.1 An Ordered Probit Model with Censoring
Let yt denote the discrete ordered label representing the underlying categories of undis-
closed order placements as described in Section 3.4. It is driven by a continuous latent
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variable y∗t with the link function given by
yt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, if y∗t ≤ γ1,
2, if γ1 < y
∗
t ≤ γ2,
...
J − 1, if γJ−2 < y∗t ≤ γJ−1,
J, if γJ−1 < y∗t ,
(1)
where J is the number of categories and γj, j = 1, . . . , J−1, denote unknown thresholds.
Furthermore, y∗t is given by
y∗t = β
′xt + εt (2)
with xt being a (K × 1) vector of regressors as defined in Section 3.5, β is a vector of
unknown parameters and εt denotes an i.i.d. standard normally distributed variable. If
the response variable yt is observed (i.e., in the case of non-censoring), the likelihood
function is given by
LUt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Φ(γ1 − β′xt) if yt = 1,
Φ(γj − β′xt)− Φ(γj−1 − β′xt) if yt ∈ {2, . . . , j, . . . , J − 1},
1− Φ(γJ−1 − β′xt) if yt = J ,
(3)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.
In cases, where yt is not directly observable but only a censored outcome y˜t linked to
yt (according to the scenarios described in Figure 3 and 4) by
y˜t = j, if yt ∈ {j + 1, . . . , J}, (4)
the likelihood function is given by
LCt =
⎧⎨⎩1− Φ(γj − β′x) if y˜t = j and j = 1, . . . , J − 2,1− Φ(γJ−1 − β′x) if y˜t ≥ J − 1. (5)
Then, the resulting log likelihood function is given by
l =
∑
t∈ζU
log(LUt ) +
∑
t∈ζC
log(LCt ), (6)
where ζU and ζC denote the index sets of uncensored and censored observations, re-
spectively.
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The marginal effects of the regressors are straightforwardly computed by
q1 =
∂F1
∂x
= −φ(γ1 − β′x)β,
q2 =
∂F2
∂x
= −(φ(γ2 − β′x)− φ(γ1 − β′x))β,
...
qJ =
∂FJ
∂x
= φ(γJ−1 − β′x)β,
(7)
which are commonly evaluated at the sample mean x¯.
In case of the dummy variables xd, we calculate the marginal effects as
ΔFj = P(y = j|x(xd=1),γ,β)− P(y = j|x(xd=0),γ,β), (8)
where x(xd=i) is a vector with the dummy variable xd set to i and all other elements
being equal to x. Appendix A gives the asymptotic distribution of the maximum
likelihood estimators q̂j and ΔF̂j .
4.2 Cross-Sectional Aggregation
We estimate the econometric model on a stock-by-stock basis. For the sake of brevity
and ease of presentation, we aggregate the corresponding estimates across stocks. To
explicitly account for differences in estimation precision, we assess the cross-sectional
statistical significance relying on a Bayesian framework attributable to DuMouchel
(1994) and implemented by Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009). As-
sume that a parameter estimate associated with stock i, βˆi, is normally distributed
with
β̂i ∼ i.i.d.N(βi, s2i )
and
βi ∼ i.i.d.N(β, σ2),
where s2i is the estimated variance of parameter i and the variance σ
2 estimated by
maximum likelihood. Then, the aggregated estimate β is obtained by summing up the
weighted estimates for all stocks as
β̂ =
N∑
i=1
wiβ̂i, wi =
(s2i + σˆ
2)−1∑N
j=1(s
2
j + σˆ
2)−1
. (9)
Assuming independence across stocks, the variance of the aggregated estimate is given
by
V(βˆ) =
1∑N
j=1(s
2
j + σˆ
2)−1
.
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5 Empirical Evidence
We estimate separate models for both ask and bid hidden orders for categorizations
based on both distance measures s and d. Covering 99 stocks over the cross-section
of the market, we estimate 396 models in total. Table 5 presents the ordered probit
estimates aggregated across all stocks. Recall that lower category labels are associ-
ated with a higher hidden order aggressiveness, thus negative coefficients reflect that
undisclosed orders are set (marginally) deeper in the spread. To assess the explanatory
power, we report the pseudo-R2 proposed by McKelvey and Zaviona (1975),
R2MZ =
∑T
t=1(ŷ
∗
t − y¯∗)2∑T
t=1(ŷ
∗
t − y¯∗)2 + T
, (10)
where ŷ∗t is the fitted value of the latent variable y∗t and y¯∗ = 1/T
∑T
t=1 ŷ
∗
t .
To provide also insights into the cross-sectional variation of estimates we show
histograms of the significant estimates (5% significance level) in Figures 10 to 13 in
Appendix B. Note that the Bayesian cross-sectional aggregates, as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2, are generally close to the averages of significant estimates as these estimates
get more weight in eq. (9). Finally, (Bayesian averaged) estimates of marginal effects
for the individual groups of low-, medium- and large-spread stocks are given in Tables 6
and 7.
Below we will discuss the individual results in light of the testable hypotheses
formulated in Section 2.3. As estimates of parameters and marginal effects are not
always straightforward to interpret, we partly illustrate the resulting effects graphically.
For the sake of brevity, we will discuss the findings for undisclosed orders on the buy
(bid) side only. The corresponding effects on the ask side are closely symmetric.
5.1 Hidden Order Placements in Dependence of Spread Sizes
We find that the size of the (displayed) bid-ask spread (SPR) has a significant impact
on the probability of hidden order placements inside of the spread. However, there
are fundamental differences between small-spread stocks and large-spread stocks. As
indicated by the marginal effects, for small-spread stocks, a widening of the spread
significantly reduces the aggressiveness of hidden order placements within the spread.
In particular, for small-spread stocks, one standard deviation spread increase implies a
decrease of the probability of hidden depth inside of the spread (category y = 1) by ap-
proximately 6.7%. Hence, the high discreteness of price grids inside of the spread seem
to cause an ”overshooting” of aggressiveness when spreads are particularly small. As
argued in Section 2.3 and supporting hypothesis (1), in this situation, order submitters
are forced to post hidden orders deeper in the spread as it would be necessary in case of
a more continuous grid. For large-spread stocks, we find similar effects though they are
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Table 5
Ordered probit estimates
Ordered probit estimates of hidden order locations on the bid and ask side depending on
categorized distance measures s and d as discussed in Section 3.4. The order aggressiveness
is declining with the category label, thus negative coefficients are associated with increasing
aggressiveness. Based on 99 NASDAQ stocks during October 2010 corresponding to 21 trading
days. Reported estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) are cross-sectional aggregates across
all stocks using the Bayesian framework of DuMouchel (1994). The reported R2 is McKelvey
and Zaviona’s (1975) pseudo R2.
Undisclosed bid limit orders Undisclosed ask limit orders
Neg. distance s Distance d Neg. distance s Distance d
SPR 0.04 (1.1) 1.37 (29.0) 0.06 (1.7) 1.34 (32.2)
DPS −0.13 (−7.2) 0.01 (2.0) −0.12 (−7.0) 0.02 (2.5)
DPO 0.00 (0.1) −0.06 (−6.5) −0.01 (−0.9) −0.06 (−6.6)
TY P 0.06 (4.7) 0.10 (7.1) 0.07 (4.9) 0.11 (7.9)
RET −0.09 (−11.0) −0.10 (−11.0) −0.08 (−12.9) 0.10 (−12.2)
V OL 0.01 (1.7) 0.01 (1.9) 0.03 (2.6) 0.02 (2.4)
HV S −0.40 (−28.3) −0.36 (−32.9) −0.43 (−27.4) −0.39 (−35.7)
HRS 0.17 (14.7) 0.14 (15.7) 0.18 (17.4) 0.16 (16.4)
HV O −0.01 (−0.9) −0.02 (−3.2) −0.00 (−0.3) −0.01 (−1.1)
HRO 0.03 (4.8) 0.03 (6.6) 0.03 (4.4) 0.03 (4.5)
ALS 0.04 (6.1) 0.01 (2.4) 0.04 (8.4) 0.02 (3.0)
ALO 0.03 (5.2) 0.02 (3.7) 0.04 (7.3) 0.03 (5.0)
HFS 0.07 (6.7) 0.03 (2.6) 0.08 (6.6) 0.03 (2.7)
HFO 0.15 (10.6) 0.11 (11.1) 0.18 (14.2) 0.15 (14.5)
OPN −0.01 (−0.3) 0.11 (2.8) −0.04 (−1.0) 0.07 (1.8)
CLS 0.14 (5.7) 0.17 (5.9) 0.13 (5.2) 0.14 (4.7)
Pseudo-R2 0.29 0.67 0.31 0.68
less distinct than in the small-spread case. Indeed, we observe partly opposite marginal
effects based on both distance measures s and d. These are explained by the fact that
the underlying aggressiveness categories are partly overlapping. In fact, ”translating”
the estimated marginal effects in Tables 6 and 7 into a graphical illustration results
in Figure 7 showing the effects of a widening of the bid-ask spread on a hypothetical
hidden order location distribution. According to the estimated marginal effects, we
observe that a widening of the spread leads to a stronger cumulation of hidden volume
inside of the spread but simultaneously relatively close to the own side. At the same
time, the distance between hidden orders and the opposite side of the market increases
as the spread widens. Hence, traders use hidden orders to compete for the provision
of liquidity with own-side liquidity suppliers (and thus to increase execution probabil-
ities) while still balancing adverse selection risks by remaining sufficiently “passive”.
Observing similar effects on the opposite side of the market, we can conclude that a
widening of the spread leads to a U-shaped concentration of hidden depth inside of the
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Table 6
Marginal effects: Aggressiveness of undisclosed orders according to their distance to the own
side (distance measure s as shown in Section 3.4)
The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label, thus negative coefficients are
associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99 NASDAQ stocks during October 2010
corresponding to 21 trading days. Reported estimates are cross-sectional aggregates using
the Bayesian framework of DuMouchel (1994) for the underlying groups of small-, medium-
and large-spread stocks. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample mean. Significant
estimates (5% level) are highlighted in boldfat. All values are given in percentages.
Small spread Medium spread Large spread
P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 3] P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 3] P[y = 4]
Panel A: Undisclosed buy limit orders
SPR -6.68 6.76 0.22 0.44 -0.69 0.21 4.76 2.06 -7.30
DPS 5.54 -5.68 0.32 0.65 -1.02 0.10 1.39 0.50 -2.30
DPO -0.23 0.46 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.54 -0.20 0.87
TY P -2.10 2.24 -0.15 -0.38 0.60 0.06 1.01 0.15 -1.40
RET 0.66 -0.78 0.37 0.76 -1.17 0.11 1.82 0.64 -2.86
V OL 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.19 0.32 -0.01 -0.32 -0.02 0.37
HV S 5.41 -5.64 2.02 4.04 -6.28 0.39 5.97 2.96 -9.63
HRS -1.04 1.10 -0.82 -1.76 2.75 -0.15 -2.47 -1.41 4.35
HVO -0.52 0.80 0.06 0.21 -0.32 0.04 1.11 0.26 -1.50
HRO -0.13 0.13 -0.09 -0.20 0.34 -0.07 -1.00 -0.27 1.54
ALS -0.17 0.18 -0.14 -0.32 0.51 -0.04 -0.52 -0.05 0.94
ALO -0.64 0.69 -0.14 -0.29 0.45 -0.01 -0.14 -0.05 0.24
HFS -0.67 0.69 -0.22 -0.61 1.01 -0.04 -0.74 -0.16 1.15
HFO -0.74 0.83 -0.73 -1.55 2.39 -0.20 -3.09 -1.37 5.09
OPN 0.51 -0.63 0.01 0.11 -0.21 0.02 0.17 -1.43 1.44
CLS 0.13 -0.19 -0.86 -1.79 2.79 -0.09 -2.22 -1.89 4.91
Panel B: Undisclosed sell limit orders
SPR -6.01 6.05 0.09 0.40 -0.49 0.25 4.28 1.07 -5.76
DPS 5.34 -5.45 0.35 0.75 -1.20 0.10 1.45 0.54 -2.26
DPO -0.74 0.76 0.06 0.20 -0.31 -0.04 -0.61 -0.14 0.87
TY P -2.63 2.92 -0.23 -0.52 0.95 0.10 1.28 0.20 -1.66
RET 0.50 -0.52 0.39 0.82 -1.25 0.11 1.58 0.47 -2.39
V OL -0.22 0.24 -0.13 -0.31 0.49 -0.00 -0.11 0.07 0.04
HV S 5.68 -5.86 2.49 4.78 -7.47 0.44 6.61 2.92 -10.26
HRS -1.19 1.21 -0.98 -1.95 3.13 -0.17 -2.84 -1.52 4.72
HVO -0.28 0.30 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.91 0.15 -1.25
HRO -0.11 0.11 -0.14 -0.31 0.46 -0.05 -0.79 -0.15 1.14
ALS -0.17 0.17 -0.25 -0.49 0.81 -0.01 -0.66 -0.26 1.13
ALO -0.59 0.65 -0.05 -0.21 0.30 -0.00 -0.49 -0.15 0.77
HFS -0.66 0.68 -0.20 -0.52 0.81 -0.04 -1.31 -0.54 2.29
HFO -1.04 1.09 -0.97 -2.01 3.11 -0.24 -3.49 -1.49 5.57
OPN 0.82 -0.86 -0.52 -0.84 1.02 0.10 1.87 0.60 -2.93
CLS 0.34 -0.41 -1.01 -2.13 3.35 -0.13 -2.24 -0.95 3.76
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Table 7
Marginal effects: Aggressiveness of undisclosed orders according to their distance to the opposite
side (distance measure d as shown in Section 3.4)
The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label, thus negative coefficients are
associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99 NASDAQ stocks during October 2010
corresponding to 21 trading days. Reported estimates are cross-sectional aggregates using
the Bayesian framework of DuMouchel (1994) for the underlying groups of small-, medium-
and large-spread stocks. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample mean. Significant
estimates (5% level) are highlighted in boldfat. All values are given in percentages.
Small spread Medium spread Large spread
P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 3] P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 3] P[y = 4]
Panel A: Undisclosed buy limit orders
SPR -27.33 28.35 -4.10 -8.93 13.46 -0.20 -5.06 -5.55 11.42
DPS -0.11 0.11 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
DPO 1.08 -1.22 0.10 0.20 -0.33 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.04
TY P -1.47 4.34 -0.25 -0.54 0.85 -0.01 0.02 0.12 -0.12
RET 0.05 -0.07 0.29 0.64 -0.98 0.06 0.59 0.68 -1.35
V OL 0.09 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
HV S 6.88 -6.89 1.26 2.58 -3.92 0.08 1.26 1.45 -2.92
HRS -0.38 0.51 -0.44 -0.92 1.46 -0.00 -0.38 -0.46 1.04
HVO 0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.16 -0.24 0.02 0.15 0.21 -0.42
HRO -0.06 0.06 -0.07 -0.16 0.25 -0.01 -0.08 -0.14 0.28
ALS -0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02
ALO -0.26 0.33 -0.03 -0.12 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.10
HFS -0.18 0.19 -0.04 -0.15 0.22 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.27
HFO -0.28 0.31 -0.38 -0.85 1.32 -0.06 -0.27 -0.39 0.84
OPN 0.33 -0.37 0.05 0.42 -0.73 -0.08 -1.79 -1.78 3.91
CLS 0.09 -0.10 -0.26 -0.60 0.98 -0.02 -1.22 -1.36 2.82
Panel B: Undisclosed sell limit orders
SPR -25.00 27.46 -4.44 -8.56 13.55 -0.31 -5.67 -6.28 13.07
DPS -0.27 0.27 -0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.04
DPO 1.02 -1.11 0.15 0.25 -0.41 -0.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.05
TY P -1.78 2.34 -0.27 -0.62 1.07 0.00 0.06 0.06 -0.08
RET 0.29 -0.31 0.25 0.60 -0.92 0.01 0.57 0.62 -1.30
V OL -0.03 0.08 -0.01 -0.07 0.09 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
HV S 6.38 -6.71 1.61 2.81 -4.61 0.03 1.64 1.68 -3.74
HRS -0.81 0.85 -0.49 -1.02 1.66 -0.00 -0.45 -0.55 1.26
HVO -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.00 0.09 0.13 -0.22
HRO -0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.16 0.23 -0.02 -0.11 -0.16 0.30
ALS -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.11 -0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.15
ALO -0.24 0.28 -0.01 -0.10 0.14 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.05
HFS -0.31 0.33 -0.05 -0.15 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.03 -0.13
HFO -0.58 0.64 -0.60 -1.11 1.82 -0.00 -0.60 -0.64 1.50
OPN 0.49 -0.66 0.27 0.58 -1.05 -0.02 -0.63 -0.82 1.47
CLS 0.27 -0.30 -0.21 -0.44 0.74 -0.02 -1.02 -1.19 2.55
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Figure 7: Stylized illustration of the effect of a widening of bid-ask spreads on hidden order
placements for large-spread stocks. Left: scenario of a narrow spread; right: scenario of a
wide spread. This illustration shows the effect of an increasing hidden order aggressiveness
in terms of the distance to the same-side quote, coming along with a decreasing hidden order
aggressiveness in terms of the distance to the opposite-side quote.
spread and thus a positive correlation between displayed spread and hidden spread.
5.2 (How) Does Hidden Liquidity Compete with Visible Liquidity
Provision?
Our estimates associated with DPS indicate that the probability of hidden depth in-
side of the spread is positively related to the own side visible depth. Hence, we find
a clear confirmation of Hypothesis (2.A) in the sense that same-side (visible) liquidity
triggers competition for hidden liquidity supply. In particular, according to the esti-
mates in Table 6, the probability of using aggressive hidden bid limit orders increases
by approximately 5.5% as the visible depth at the best bid increases by one standard
deviation. Confirming Buti and Rindi (2011) traders obviously increase their aggres-
siveness in order to compete for the provision of liquidity and thus to increase execution
probabilities. This is particularly true for large-spread stocks offering sufficient room
for undercutting (or overbidding, respectively) prevailing displayed quotes within the
spread. In the case of small-spread stocks we observe partly contradicting marginal ef-
fects based on the two underlying distance measures. The resulting effects of own-side
depth increases are similar to the effects illustrated in Figure 7 for spread increases.
Hence, in case of small spreads offering not much room for (hidden) quote improve-
ments, a higher (visible) own-side depth does not necessarily lead to hidden depth
locations deeper in the spread but rather to a stronger clustering of hidden orders close
to the own-side quote. This is still in line with Hypothesis (2.A).
Hypothesis (2.B) is only confirmed in the case of large-spread stocks. We observe
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Figure 8: Stylized illustration of the effect of an increase of visible ask depth on undisclosed
buy order placements for large-spread stocks. Left: low visible depth ; right: high visible
depth. This illustration shows the effect of a decreasing hidden order aggressiveness in terms of
the distance to the opposite-side quote, coming along with no significant effects on the hidden
order aggressiveness in terms of the distance to the same-side quote.
that only the effects based on the distance s are significant while their counterparts
based on d are insignificant. As illustrated by Figure 8, this may be induced by the
hidden depth distribution shifting to the own side and/or the use of reserve orders
rather than hidden orders. This effect is in line with the notion that hidden liquidity
suppliers aim at reducing adverse selection risk if the price pressure on the opposite
side becomes too high. The finding is in line with Buti and Rindi (2011)’s theoretical
prediction that an increase of opposite-side visible depth triggers an increased use
of reserve orders instead of hidden orders. Pardo Tornero and Pascual (2007) and
De Winne and D’Hondt (2007) find similar evidence for the Spanish Stock Exchange
and Euronext Paris where, however, only reserve orders but not hidden orders can be
used.
In case of medium-spread and small-spread stocks, we observe converse effects with
rising hidden aggressiveness if the opposite-side depth is increased. “Translating” the
estimated marginal effects into a graphical illustration according to Figure 9 shows an
increasing use of reserve orders and a rising hidden order aggressiveness. In this situa-
tion, adverse selection risk is obviously less dominant and seems to be overcompensated
by liquidity suppliers’ incentive to increase execution probabilities.
5.3 Hidden Order Placements After Price Movements and Trading
Signals
We show that the aggressiveness of hidden bid depth decreases when the prevailing
trade is seller-initiated (TYP). In particular, the hidden bid depth shifts away from the
ask side. This reduces liquidity suppliers’ risk of being picked off by (eventually better
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Figure 9: Stylized illustration of the effect of an increase of visible ask depth on undisclosed
buy order placements for medium-spread stocks. Left: low visible depth ; right: high visible
depth. This illustration shows the effect of increasing hidden order aggressiveness in terms of
the distance to the opposite-side quote, coming along with no significant effects on the hidden
order aggressiveness in terms of the distance to the same-side quote.
informed) sellers but increases their risk of non-execution. Conversely, in case of a buy
market order, hidden liquidity supply on the bid side increases and moves toward the
ask side. Hence, liquidity suppliers follow trading directions in the sense that they post
more aggressively and thus increase execution probabilities without facing too high
adverse selection risk (as long as buy pressure dominates).
In this sense, Hypothesis (3.A) is confirmed. Besides economic reasoning, a pure
mechanical effect may further drive the results. In particular, as a sell trade itself
absorbs pending aggressive undisclosed buy limit orders, the aggressiveness of hidden
bid depth temporarily decreases. This effect, however, is only true in case of trades
arriving instantaneously before the observation of interest. But as our estimates utilize
all order messages revealing information on hidden orders (occurring on average 30
times more frequently than trades), these mechanical effects apply only infrequently.
Analyzing the effects of recent price movements (RET ) on hidden order placements,
we find similar effects and supportive evidence in favor of Hypothesis (3.B). Accord-
ingly, the aggressiveness of undisclosed bid orders increases as prices have been moved
upwards. Specifically, the probability of hidden orders inside of the spread increases
by approximately 2.9% when the return increases by one standard deviation. More-
over, the estimates in Table 5 show that hidden bid depth moves closer to the ask side.
Again, this supports liquidity suppliers’ motivation to reduce the risk of non-execution.
Conversely, in case of prevailing negative price movements, hidden liquidity placements
on the bid side become less aggressive with the hidden depth distribution shifting away
from the ask side. As postulated in Section 2.3, this is explained by protection against
picking-off risks in case prices continue moving downwards.
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Interestingly, no clear confirmation of Hypothesis (4) is found. We do not find
significant impacts of prevailing return volatility. According to our estimates, hidden
order aggressiveness even tends to increase in volatile market periods. However, in
most cases, these effects are insignificant.
5.4 Competition for Hidden Liquidity Provision
Our estimates show clear evidence for competition between hidden liquidity providers.
According to the estimates associated with the effects of own-side hidden liquidity
supply (HV S), we support Hypothesis (5). In particular, Table 6 reports that the
probability of hidden bid depth inside of the spread increases by approximately 10% as
the execution of hidden bid volume during the last minute increases by one standard
deviation. This effect is supported by the estimates in Table 7 indicating that hidden
liquidity shifts closer to the opposite side of the market. Hence, according to the rea-
soning motivating Hypothesis (5), liquidity suppliers are encouraged to provide further
hidden volume if they realize liquidity demand from the opposite side and competition
on their own side.
According to Buti and Rindi (2011) these effects prevail as long as adverse selection
risk does not become too high. Indeed, Testing this hypothesis by controlling for
prevailing hidden depth execution relative to that during the last five minutes (HRS),
we find negative effects. In particular, hidden order aggressiveness tends to decline if
hidden depth demand becomes extraordinarily high. In this situation, price pressure
from the opposite side becomes too strong and makes adverse selection risk too high.
Studying the effect of hidden order detections on the opposite side of the market, we
find slight evidence for the effect that trading against hidden sell orders also increases
the hidden order aggressiveness on the bid side. This might be explained by the fact
that buy market orders make buy hidden orders (relatively) less aggressive and move
away hidden ask quotes. This, in turn, gives hidden liquidity suppliers on the bid side
more room for quote improvements and thus the reduction of non-execution risks.
5.5 Hidden Order Placements and HFT
Analyzing the effects of HFT (approximated by the intensity of fleeting orders) on
hidden order submissions, we find strong empirical support for Hypothesis (6). Indeed,
the more opposite-side traders try to detect hidden liquidity by “pinging activities”
(HFO), the lower is the hidden order aggressiveness. Especially for large-spread stocks,
an one-standard-deviation increase of HFT activities on the ask side implies a decrease
of the probability of hidden bid depth placements inside of the spread by more than 5%.
Consequently, the distribution of hidden depth moves away from the opposite quote.
Hence, liquidity suppliers interpret the rapid cancellations of limit orders as signals for
34
hidden liquidity detection strategies rather than true liquidity supply. These results
are in line with empirical evidence reported by Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) and the
predictions by Buti and Rindi (2011) showing that hidden order placements become
non-attractive if hidden depth is easily detected.
Note that the effects on the distribution of the entire hidden depth, i.e., also that
behind the market (as reported in Table 7) are substantially smaller than those on hid-
den depth inside of the spread (as revealed by Table 6). This finding also supports the
theoretical prediction by Buti and Rindi (2011) that reserve orders, rather than hidden
orders, are dominantly used when parasitic traders utilize front running strategies.
5.6 Intraday Patterns
We find no clear confirmation of Hypothesis (7.A) postulating a higher hidden order ag-
gressiveness during or after the opening period. Actually, our findings for small-spread
stocks support the hypothesis, while it is rejected for large-spread stocks. However,
clear evidence for Hypothesis (7.B) is shown. Indeed, for large-spread stocks, we find
that the probability for hidden bid depth placements within the spread in the hour
before market closure is approximately 5% lower than during the rest of the day. This
supports the economic reasoning that displayed orders are preferred if the time horizon
becomes shorter and the importance of time priority rises.
6 Conclusions
Many stock exchanges around the world choose to reduce market transparency by al-
lowing traders to hide a portion of their order size. As a consequence, trading under
limited pre-trade transparency becomes increasingly popular in financial markets. Pre-
vious studies in the literature examine opaque markets with only partially undisclosed
orders. This study sheds light on traders’ use of completely undisclosed orders in elec-
tronic trading, based on a sample of 99 stocks traded on NASDAQ during October
2010.
Employing NASDAQ TotalView message data, we retrieve information on hidden
depth from visible order activities and propose an ordered response approach with
censoring mechanism for modelling hidden order locations conditional on the state of
market. Our findings show that hidden liquidity supply is significantly correlated with
market conditions and thus is predictable in terms of the state of the prevailing (visible)
LOB and order flow. Our empirical evidence is in line with theoretical predictions
and suggests that hidden liquidity suppliers post orders by strategically balancing non-
execution risk and picking-off risk. We show the following effects: First, hidden spreads
are positively correlated with observable spreads. Second, hidden liquidity competes
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with displayed liquidity and hidden liquidity on the own side of the market. Third,
hidden order placements follow recent price movements and trading signals. Fourth,
hidden order placement is reduced if hidden order execution strategies are prevailing.
Our findings might serve as valuable input to calibrate and further develop theo-
retical models. The proposed empirical model can be extended in various directions
yielding an even more precise assessment of hidden order placement.
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A Asymptotic Distribution of Marginal Dummy Effects
The asymptotic covariance of marginal dummy effects is straightforwardly computed
using the delta method. Let θ = [β′, γ1, . . . , γJ−1]′ be the vector of (K+J−1) unknown
parameters, θ̂ denotes the maximum likelihood estimator with V ≡ Asy.Var[θ̂] being
its (K + J − 1) × (K + J − 1) asymptotic covariance matrix. Then, the asymptotic
covariance matrix of the corresponding marginal effects is given by
Asy.Var[q̂j ] =
[
∂q̂j
∂θ̂
′
]
V
[
∂q̂j
∂θ̂
′
]′
, (A.1)
where the derivatives of q̂j with respect to θ̂
′
are
∂q̂1
∂θ̂
′ =
[
φ1(IK − z1β̂x′), φ1z1β̂, 0, · · · , 0
]
,
∂q̂2
∂θ̂
′ =
[
(φ1 − φ2)IK + (φ1z1 − φ2z2)β̂x′, −φ1z1β̂, φ2z2β̂, · · · , 0
]
,
...
∂q̂J
∂θ̂
′ =
[
φJ−1(IK + zJ−1β̂x′), 0, 0, · · · , −φJ−1zJ−1β̂
]
,
(A.2)
with IK denoting a K ×K identity matrix, 0 is a (K × 1) zero vector and zj and φj
given by zj ≡ γj − β̂′x and φj ≡ φ(zj). Then,
Asy.Var[ΔF̂j ] =
[
∂ΔF̂j
∂θ̂′
]
V
[
∂ΔF̂j
∂θ̂
′
]′
, (A.3)
where
∂ΔF̂j
∂θ̂
′ =
∂F̂j
∂θ̂
′
∣∣∣∣∣
x(xd=1)
− ∂F̂j
∂θ̂
′
∣∣∣∣∣
x(xd=0)
with
∂F̂1
∂θ̂
′ =
[
φ1x
′, φ1, 0, · · · , 0
]
,
∂F̂2
∂θ̂
′ =
[
(φ2 − φ1)x′, −φ1, φ2, · · · , 0
]
,
...
∂F̂J
∂θ̂
′ =
[
φJ−1x′, 0, 0, · · · , −φJ−1
]
.
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B Histograms of Significant Ordered Probit Estimates
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Figure 10: Histogram of significant estimates. Ordered probit estimates of hidden order lo-
cations on the bid and ask side depending on categorized measures s and d as presented in
Section 3.4. The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label, thus negative co-
efficients are associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99 NASDAQ stocks during
October 2010 corresponding to 21 trading days. The histogram shows estimates which signifi-
cantly different from zero on the 5%-level. TY P is adjusted such that it equals 1 whenever the
prevailing trade consumes the own-side liquidity, −1 otherwise.
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Figure 11: Histogram of significant estimates. Ordered probit estimates of hidden order
locations on the bid and ask side depending on categorized measures s and d as presented
in Section 3.4. The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label, thus negative
coefficients are associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99 NASDAQ stocks during
October 2010 corresponding to 21 trading days. The histogram shows estimates which are
significantly different from zero at 5%-level. RET is adjusted such that it is positive whenever
mid-quotes move away from the own side of the market.
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Figure 12: Histogram of significant estimates. Ordered probit estimates of hidden order
locations on the bid and ask side depending on categorized measures s and d as presented
in Section 3.4. The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label, thus negative
coefficients are associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99 NASDAQ stocks during
October 2010 corresponding to 21 trading days. The histogram shows estimates which are
significantly different from zero at 5%-level. “Low frequency” limit orders are defined as orders
submitted during the prevailing 3 minutes and have not been canceled yet.
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Figure 13: Histogram of significant estimates. Ordered probit estimates of hidden order
locations on the bid and ask side depending on categorized measures s and d as discussed
in Section 3.4. The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label, thus negative
coefficients are associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99 NASDAQ stocks during
October 2010 correspondint to 21 trading days. The histogram shows estimates which are
significantly different from zero at 5%-level. A fleeting order is defined as a limit order canceled
at latest one second after the submission.
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